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Hindering Permanency, One Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Claim at a Time
Michael Andriano, Esq.*

Introduction
The termination of parental rights (TPR) is the death sentence to a
parent-child relationship. 1 At stake—the end of the right to maintain what
will often be the most important relationship in a person’s life. 2 In July
2015, the Florida Supreme Court finally recognized a right to effective
assistance of counsel for parents in TPR proceedings and formulated a
standard to determine counsel’s effectiveness, as well as a procedure for
the parents to bring claims of ineffectiveness. 3 The standard promulgated
is properly in line with the heightened concerns of the best interests of the
child. Yet, the new procedure endangers Florida’s children by
significantly delaying permanency because of the recognized right to
effective assistance of counsel; therefore, an attorney’s competence is
more paramount now than ever. Without the establishment of proper
competency guidelines or dependency trainings, Florida’s attorneys are
disadvantaged and subject to numerous claims of providing ineffective
assistance of counsel. The increasing volume of these claims will lead to
delays in permanency for children. Further, without the remedy of a direct
appeal, there is a substantial risk that Florida’s children will face periods
of uncertainty, unnecessarily being kept in impermanent placements.
*J.D., Cum Laude, 2016, Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law; B.S. in
Legal Studies with specialization in Public Law, 2013, University of Central Florida.
1See also In re K.S., 515 P.2d 130, 133 (Colo. App. Ct. 1973) (“The child loses the right
of support and maintenance, for which he may thereafter be dependent upon society; the
right to inherit; and all other rights inherent in the legal parent-child relationship, not just
for [a limited] period . . ., but forever.”); In re Adoption of T.M.F., 537 A.2d 1035, 1052
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (Beck, J., concurring) (quoting In re Coast, 561 A.2d 762, 778 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1989) (Tamilia, J., concurring).
2In re Adoption of T.M.F., 537 A.2d at 1052 (Beck, J., concurring).
3The ruling was handed down in the case of J.B. v. Fla. Dep’t. of Children & Families,
170 So. 3d 780, 790 (Fla. 2015).
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In taking an in-depth look at the nature of the constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel, this article urges Florida to adopt
guidelines and standards of competency for dependency attorneys to abide
by in order to provide effective representation, so as to not delay
permanency for Florida’s children. Further, this article will urge Florida
to adopt a direct appeal procedure for ineffective assistance of counsel
claims in place of the interim procedure. If Florida does not adopt
guidelines, standards, and a direct appeal procedure, the newly established
procedure risks prolonging impermanent placements for Florida’s
children. This will be done by looking at the procedures followed by other
states handling such claims and their standards of representation attorneys
must follow. If there is effective representation from the outset, there is a
minimal chance that the parent will be in a position to file an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, thereby keeping with the statutory goals of
achieving permanency for Florida’s children with swiftness.

Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings in
Florida
The goal in a TPR proceeding is to get the child into a healthy
environment and, preferably, to find adoptive parents. 4 “It has been the
constant practice of the common law to respect the entitlement of those
who bring a child into the world to raise that child.” 5 However, state
interference in the domestic relations of its citizens has always been a
necessary, but mostly unhappy precept of our nation. While Florida courts
have recognized the right of parents to the care and custody of their
children, that right is not absolute, but is instead subject to the overriding
principle that the ultimate welfare or best interest of the child that must
prevail. 6 Children require secure, stable, long-term, and continuous
relationships with their parents or foster parents and are entitled to an
environment free of physical and emotional violence. 7 The State has a
compelling interest to protect all of its citizens, especially its youth, against
the clear threat of abuse, neglect, and death. 8 Children have a right to grow
up in a wholesome and healthful environment. 9 If parents are unable or
4See

generally FLA. STAT. § 39.802 (2015), § 39.806 (2015). See also E.T. v. State, 930
So. 2d 721, 727 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
5Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2572 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 557 So. 2d 565, 571. (Fla. 1991).
7Id. See also Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s Servs., 458 U.S. 502, 513 (1982).
8 Id.
9See generally FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)(a) (2015); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t. of
Multnomah Cnty. v. Geist, 796 P.2d 1193, 1202 (Or. 1990).
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unwilling to rehabilitate themselves within a reasonable amount of time so
they can provide such an environment, the best interests of the child
generally will require a TPR. 10 However, a termination determination
cannot be based on a single act or omission, but rather, requires an analysis
of the totality of the circumstances. 11
All proceedings seeking a TPR order must be initiated by the filing
of a petition by the Department of Children and Families (DCF), the
guardian ad litem, or any other person who has knowledge of the facts
alleged or is informed of them and believes they are true. 12 Section 39.802
of the Florida Statutes details the specific allegations and facts that must
be included in the TPR petition. 13 Section 39.806 of the Florida Statutes
details the basis upon which one can petition to have a parent’s rights
terminated. 14 These grounds mainly include egregious conduct towards
the child or the threat of future egregious conduct. 15 Essentially, parental
conduct that threatens the well-being of a child that is not likely to be cured
by rehabilitative services will serve as a ground for TPR. 16
The dependency court process usually begins with a report to the
child abuse hotline alleging child abuse, neglect, or abandonment. 17 As a
result of the report, a child protective investigator or county sheriff visits
the child’s home to determine whether the child’s living environment is
unsafe. 18 If the living environment is considered unsafe, and the child is in
need of court protection, the child may be removed from the home or a
petition filed for dependency or shelter. 19 If a child is removed, a shelter

10See

generally FLA. STAT. § 39.806 (2015); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t. of Multnomah
Cnty. v. Geist, 796 P.2d 1193, 1202 (Or. 1990).
11W.R. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 896 So. 2d 911 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005.
12FLA. STAT. § 39.802 (2015).
13Id. at (4)(a)-(d):
(4) A petition for termination of parental rights filed under this chapter must contain
facts supporting the following allegations:
(a) That at least one of the grounds listed in s. 39.806 has been met.
(b) That the parents of the child were informed of their right to counsel at all
hearings that they attended and that a dispositional order adjudicating the child
dependent was entered in any prior dependency proceeding relied upon in offering a
parent a case plan as described in s. 39.806.
(c) That the manifest best interests of the child, in accordance with s. 39.810, would
be served by the granting of the petition.
(d) That the parents of the child will be informed of the availability of private
placement of the child with an adoption entity, as defined in s. 63.032.
14FLA. STAT. § 39.806 (2015).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17Office of Court Improvement, A Caregiver’s Guide to Dependency Court (2015).
18 Id.
19 Id.
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petition must be filed immediately thereafter. 20 The child’s parents are
then entitled to a hearing, before the child is removed, where the judge
determines whether probable cause exists to place or keep the child in
shelter status pending further investigation of the incident. 21
During the time the State has custody of the child, the court will order
the State to provide certain services for the parents. 22 These services may
include psychological counseling, substance-abuse treatment, parenting
classes, homemaker assistance, and other services to remedy the problem
that led to the child’s removal from the home. 23 It is the State’s
responsibility to ensure factors impeding the ability of caregivers to fulfill
their responsibilities are identified through the dependency process and
appropriate recommendations and services to address those problems are
considered in any judicial or non-judicial proceeding. 24 The purpose and
ultimate goal of these services is to facilitate the reunification of the
family. 25 In keeping with this goal, the department must show it has made
a good faith effort to rehabilitate the parent(s) and reunite the family. 26
However, reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families are not
required if the court has determined certain harmful events have or will
continue to occur. 27 Some of these events include: abandonment of the
child; egregious conduct by the parent(s) that demonstrates the continuing
involvement of the parent in the child’s life that threatens their well-being
as a whole; and incarceration of one or both parents. 28 The State must meet
its burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence in order for the
court to make a determination to permanently deprive a parent of the
custody of their child. 29 The Florida Supreme Court has defined clear and
convincing evidence as an:
Intermediate level of proof that entails both a qualitative
and quantitative standard. The evidence must be credible; the
memories of the witnesses must be clear and without confusion;
and the sum total of the evidence must be of sufficient weight to
convince the trier of fact without hesitancy. 30
20

Id.
Id.
22CALKINS, infra note 60, at 182.
23 Id.
24FLA. STAT. § 39.001(7) (2015).
25FLA. STAT. § 39.621(2)(a) (2015).
26Padgett, supra note 6.
27FLA. STAT. § 39.806(2) (2015).
28Id. at (1)(b)-(d), (1)(f)-(m).
29Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571; Torres v. Van Eepoel, 98 So. 2d 735, 737 (Fla. 1957); W.R.,
896 So. 2d at 914.
30In Re Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995).
21
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Implicit in this standard is the basic requirement that, under ordinary
circumstances, the State must show the parent abused, neglected, or
abandoned a child. 31 The trial judge has the duty of finding facts and
resolving any conflicts in the evidence. 32
The Supreme Court also requires clear and convincing evidence in
TPR proceedings and for good reason. In Santosky v. Kramer, the Court
held that before a state may sever the rights of parents to their child, due
process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and
convincing evidence. 33 The Court noted, “A clear and convincing
evidence standard adequately conveys to the factfinder the level of
subjective certainty about his factual conclusions necessary to satisfy due
process.” 34 Further, the Court stated this standard of proof is consistent
with the two state interests at stake – a “parens patriae” interest in
preserving and promoting the child’s welfare and a fiscal and
administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden of such
proceedings. 35 Essentially, requiring this elevated standard of proof helps
to eliminate the risk that a judge might decide to deprive a parent based
solely on a few isolated incidents of abnormal conduct or “idiosyncratic
behavior.” 36
Further, the state has the burden of demonstrating the TPR is the least
restrictive means of protecting the child from serious harm. 37 The least
restrictive means test, in this context, is not intended to preserve the
parental bond at the cost of the child’s future. 38 Rather, it simply requires
that those measures short of termination should be utilized if such
measures can permit the safe reestablishment of the parent-child bond. 39
Least restrictive means test indicates that there cannot be a less
constraining method for the state to achieve its purpose. 40 If the court can
think of another method for the state to meet its goals that is less restrictive
than the TPR, the state’s petition will fail. 41 Essentially applying strict
scrutiny, the court requires the state action be justified by a compelling
governmental purpose, necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve that
31Padgett,

supra note 6.
658 So. 2d at 967.
33455 U.S. 745, 768-69.
34Id. at 769.
35Id. at 766-67.
36Id. at 764.
37L.B. v. Dep’t. of Children & Families, 835 So. 2d 1189, 1195 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002);
Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571.
38L.B., 835 So. 2d at 1195.
39 Id.
40See generally D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 339-40 (Fla. 2013).
41Id. at 340.
32E.A.W.,
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purpose, and the least restrictive means used to achieve that purpose.42 The
rationale for the state having to meet such a high burden subject to the
highest level of judicial scrutiny is, not only due to the fact that there is an
infringement on a fundamental right, but more importantly, because the
state is seeking to end this fundamental right forever.43 “Increasing the
burden of proof is one way to impress the factfinder with the importance
of the decision and thereby reduce the chances that inappropriate
terminations will be ordered.” 44
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDINGS
The constitutional right to counsel in TPR proceedings is based on
the recognition that there is a constitutionally protected interest in
“preserving the family and raising one’s children.” 45 Parental rights have
long been held to be one of the most precious of the unenumerated
fundamental rights and liberty interests. Far more precious than property
rights, parental rights have been deemed to be among those essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men and to be more significant and
priceless than liberties, which derive merely from shifting economic
arrangements. 46 Freedom of personal choice in matters of family life has
long been viewed as a fundamental liberty interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 47 It should follow then that due process requires
parents have a right to counsel in all TPR proceedings to protect this
precious liberty interest.
However, the Supreme Court has refused to recognize that this right
is required. In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the Court held
that the Federal Due Process clause does not require appointed counsel in
every state-initiated TPR proceeding. 48 Instead, it required trial courts to
42Id.

at 339 (“We subject statutes that interfere with an individual’s fundamental rights to
strict scrutiny analysis, which requires the State to prove that the legislation furthers a
compelling governmental interest through the least intrusive means.”).
43Id. at 339-40 (the Constitution provides heightened protection against government
interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests).
44Santosky, 455 U.S. at 764-65.
45S.B. v. Dep’t. of Children & Families, 851 So. 2d 689, 692 (Fla. 2003). See also
Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 570 (recognizing a constitutionally protected fundamental liberty
interest in parents raising their children “free from the heavy hand of government
paternalism”).
46Lassiter v. Dep’t. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 38 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
47Id. See also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753; Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431
U.S. 816, 845 (1977); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality
opinion); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
48452 U.S. at 31-32 (holding that appointment of counsel in all TPR proceedings is not a
due process requirement under the United States Constitution).
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evaluate the need for counsel on a case-by-case basis. 49 The Court
balanced the competing interests in determining whether an indigent
parent was entitled to appointment of counsel in TPR proceedings. 50 Those
interests were the parent’s interest in accuracy and justice, the
government’s interest in the child’s welfare and cost avoidance, and the
risk of erroneously depriving a parent of a child. 51 The Court noted in
previous cases the right to counsel was found “only where the litigant may
lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation,” and concluded that there
is a presumption that a litigant has a right to counsel only when he may be
deprived of his physical liberty. 52 The Court stated it was only determining
the minimum due process standard under the federal constitution and that
many states may have higher standards based on wise public policy. 53 This
is odd, seeing how the Court has repeatedly accorded a high degree of
constitutional respect to a natural parent’s interest in raising their
children. 54 Fortunately, Florida can constitutionally provide more
protections for its citizens than the United States Constitution can. 55 These
added protections stem from Article I, § 9 of Florida’s Constitution – the
Due Process Clause. 56
The Florida Supreme Court long ago in D.B. addressed the question
of whether state provision of counsel to indigent parents in dependency
and TPR proceedings was necessary for fundamental fairness. 57 In a 1980
appeal of an order terminating parental rights under Chapter 39, the
Florida Supreme Court held that an indigent parent has a right, under the
Due Process Clause of the Constitutions of the United States and Florida,
to appointed counsel in proceedings involving the permanent TPR to a
child, or when the proceedings may lead to criminal child abuse charges. 58
However, where there is no threat of permanent termination of parental
custody, the right to counsel in dependency proceedings should be
determined on a case-by-case basis. 59
49

Id.

50Id.

at 31.
Id.
52Id. at 25-27.
53Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33-34.
54Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 38-39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 232-34 (1972); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
55M.E.K. v. R.L.K., 921 So. 2d 787, 790 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (In the area of termination
of parental rights, the Florida due process clause provides higher due process standards
than the federal due process clause).
56FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 9 Due Process: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law . . .”
57In the Interest of D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 90 (Fla. 1980).
58 Id.
59Id. at 91.
51
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Because the Supreme Court has not declared that the Federal Due
process Clause requires the appointment of counsel in every TPR case,
even in subsequent cases after Lassiter, the rights of indigent parents
remain at risk. 60 This is because states may repeal their statutory authority
for counsel or withdraw funding for court-appointed counsel. 61 However,
contrary to the holding of Lassiter, Florida’s Supreme Court has
consistently continued to confirm that D.B. stands for the proposition that
a constitutional right to appointed counsel arises when the proceeding can
result in a permanent loss of parental rights. 62 Additionally, the Florida
Constitution contains a separate privacy protection stating an individual
has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the
person’s private life. 63 The Florida Supreme Court has interpreted this
provision to provide greater protection than is afforded by the Federal
Constitution and to include specific protection against state interference in
parents’ fundamental right to raise their children, except in cases where
the child is threatened with harm. 64 However, independent of Florida’s
Due Process Clause and the Right to Privacy Clause, in 1995 the Florida
Legislature codified a statutory law providing that parents have a right to
counsel in both dependency and TPR proceedings. 65
As the Florida Supreme Court has eloquently stated: “It is a basic
tenet of our society and law that individuals have the fundamental
constitutionally protected rights to procreate and to be a parent to their
children.” 66 These constitutional rights are recognized by both the Florida
60Susan

Calkins, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Parental-Rights Termination Cases:
The Challenge for Appellate Courts, 6 J. App. Prac. & Process 179, 192 (2004).
61 Id.
62J.B., 170 So. 3d at 790-91; In the Interest of E.H., 609 So. 2d 1289, 1290 (Fla. 1992);
Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 961 (Fla. 1992); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1196 (Fla.
1989).
63FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23 Right of Privacy: “Every natural person has the right to be let
alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person’s private life . . .”
64D.M.T., 129 So. 3d at 335. See also Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1275-76 (Fla.
1996) (recognizing that parents’ fundamental right to raise their children is protected by
Florida’s state constitutional right to privacy).
65FLA. STAT. § 39.013 (2015). Procedures and jurisdiction; right to counsel:
[P]arents must be informed by the court o their right to counsel in dependency
proceedings at each stage of the dependency proceedings. Parents who are unable to
afford counsel must be appointed counsel.
...
(9)(a) At each stage of the proceedings under this chapter, the court shall advise the
parents of the right to counsel. The court shall appoint counsel for indigent parents. The
court shall ascertain whether the right to counsel is understood. When right to counsel is
waived, the court shall determine whether the waiver is knowing and intelligent. The
court shall enter its findings in writing with respect to the appointment or waiver of
counsel for indigent parents or the waiver of counsel by nonindigent parents.
66D.M.T., 129 So. 3d at 334. See also J.B., 170 So. 3d at 789.
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Constitution and the United States Constitution, as the interest of parents
in the care, custody, and control of their children are perhaps the oldest of
the fundamental liberty interests recognized in American law. 67 This
fundamental liberty interest is especially implicated in TPR proceedings
because the state is seeking not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty
interest, but to end it. The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents
in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate
simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary
custody of their child to the state. 68 Parents still retain a vital interest in
preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life and, therefore,
have a more critical need for protections of their parental rights. 69
The State of Florida has recognized the sanctity of the biological
connection between parent and child and the fundamental right to be a
parent. 70 Because of this recognition, Florida has afforded substantial
protections to the fundamental liberty interest of parents and chosen to
employ the highest standards of due process to its citizens. 71 “For the value
of protecting our liberty from deprivation by the State without due process
of law is priceless.” 72
THE ATTENDANT RECOGNIZED RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL IN TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES
The New Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
Before July 2015, the Florida Supreme Court, while recognizing a
right to counsel in TPR proceedings, never expressly recognized a clear
right to the effective assistance of that counsel.73 Further, there was not a
proper procedure established by the court or legislature for vindicating an
67D.M.T.,

129 So. 3d at 334; Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). See also
Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that procreation is
one of the basic civil rights of man and is fundamental to the very existence and survival
of the race); In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 966 (Fla. 1995) (“The
United States Supreme Court has held that natural parents have a fundamental liberty
interest in the care, custody, and management of their children.” (citing Santosky, 455
U.S. at 753)).
68Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 570 (citing Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54).
69 Id.
70D.M.T., 129 So. 3d at 327 (“The intangible fibers that connect parent and child have
infinite variety. They are woven throughout the fabric of our society, providing it with
strength, beauty, and flexibility. It is self-evident that they are sufficiently vital to merit
constitutional protection in appropriate cases.”) (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248, 256 (1983)).
71D.M.T., 129 So. 3d at 334-35.
72Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73J.B., 170 So. 3d at 785.
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ineffective assistance of counsel claim in TPR proceedings. 74 Numerous
Florida District Courts of Appeals previously held that parents have a right
to effective counsel and subsequently certified the question to the Florida
Supreme Court on separate occasions, expressing a need for a procedure
to enforce that right. 75 The Florida Supreme Court declined jurisdiction
and instead referred the issue to both the Juvenile Court Rules Committee
and the Appellate Court Rules Committee. 76 Both committees, however,
declined to address the issue of a proper procedure for ineffective
assistance of counsel claims absent a clear recognition by the court of a
right to the effective assistance of counsel. 77 Thus, Florida courts for many
years were left without guidance on this issue.
In J.B., the Florida Supreme Court expressly recognized the right of
counsel to indigent parents under the Florida Constitution in TPR
proceedings includes the attendant constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel and requires a means of vindicating that right. 78 In
establishing this right, the court has acknowledged the importance of the
fundamental rights at issue. 79 “A fair trial is necessary to protect the basic
parental interest at stake and to achieve a result upon which everyone can
rely.” 80 In an effort to reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation of parent’s
rights, the trial court should inquire throughout the course of the TPR
proceedings if the parents are satisfied with the performance of their
attorney. 81 Further, the trial court should take all necessary steps to remedy
any perceived problem regarding the lawyer’s representation. 82 In
recognizing this right, the court was cognizant of the important interest
Florida’s children have in reaching permanency and timely disposition of
these claims is paramount. 83

74

Id.
re E.K., 33 So. 3d 125, 127 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“Although the [Florida] supreme
court has not explicitly said so, it appears that a parent who is entitled to appointed
counsel in a termination of parental rights proceeding is implicitly entitled to effective
assistance of counsel.”); E.T., 930 So. 2d at 722 (“A constitutional right to counsel means
effective counsel; otherwise, the right is meaningless.”); In re M.R., 565 So. 2d 371, 372
(Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“Consequently, we hold that such counsel must provide services
which are sufficient to provide meaningful assistance.”).
76J.B., 170 So. 3d at 790.
77 Id.
78Id. at 785, 790.
79Id. at 789.
80Calkins, supra, at 229.
81CALKINS, supra, at 229; see also J.B., 170 So. 3d at 799 (Pariente, J., concurring).
82J.B., 170 So. 3d at 799 (Pariente, J., concurring).
83Id. at 793.
75In
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The New Standard for Determining Counsel’s Effectiveness
The J.B. court further established the appropriate standard for
determining counsel’s effectiveness. 84 The court noted the constitutional
right to counsel afforded to parents in TPR proceedings is not derived from
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which guarantees
counsel to criminal defendants. 85 Instead, as discussed previously, the
right to counsel is derived from the due process clause of Florida’s
Constitution. 86 This distinction between the origins of the right to counsel
was necessary to make a final determination on the exact standard to be
applied in determining effectiveness of counsel in TPR proceedings. 87
The court analyzed two standards that have been used by courts in
different jurisdictions to answer the inquiry of what standard applies to a
determination of the effectiveness of counsel in TPR proceedings: the
Strickland standard, which applies to ineffective assistance of counsel
claims in criminal cases, and the fundamental fairness standard,
announced in Geist. 88 Under Strickland, the defendant must establish
counsel’s performance was deficient by showing counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning adequately as guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment, and as a result of those errors the defendant was
prejudiced and deprived of a fair trial. 89 Prejudice under the Strickland
standard is established if confidence in the outcome is undermined. 90
Under Geist, the fundamental fairness standard requires not only that a
parent show that trial counsel was inadequate, but also that any inadequacy
prejudiced them to the extent the parent was denied a fair trial and,
therefore, the circuit court’s decision is called into serious question. 91
“Fundamental fairness requires that appointed counsel exercise
professional skill and judgment.” 92 However, reversal is not warranted if
the reviewing court finds the proceeding was fundamentally fair and that
even with competent counsel, the result inevitably would have been the
same. 93
84Id.

at 792.
at 790.
86Id. at 791.
87Anthony C. Musto, Potato, Potahto: Whether Ineffective Assistance or Due Process, An
Effective Rule is Overdue in Termination of Parental Rights Cases in Florida, 21 St.
Thomas L.Rev. 231, 243 (2009) (“It seems logical that if the right to counsel in a
particular situation arises from due process, the issue of whether some act or omission of
counsel rendered a proceeding unfair should be deemed to be one of due process.”).
88Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Geist, 796 P.2d at 1193.
89J.B., 170 So. 3d at 791 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
90Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986).
91Geist, 796 P.2d at 1204.
92Id. at 1203.
93Id. at 1204.
85Id.
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The court in J.B. acknowledged that there are substantial, important
differences in the purposes of criminal as opposed to TPR proceedings. 94
Most significant is that the liberty interests at stake in criminal cases are
simply not equivalent to that involved in custody cases involving
children. 95 In criminal proceedings, the paramount interest is protecting
the rights of the accused, including the right to counsel. 96 However,
dependency and TPR cases have a significant interest in the child having
a prompt and permanent resolution of his or her custody status. 97 The
consideration given to the child in reaching permanency without undue
delay is substantially heightened because of the harm that results when
there is uncertainty in a child’s placement. 98 Therefore, challenging
counsel’s effectiveness in TPR proceedings is different from the
traditional attack on criminal judgments because the same rights or liberty
interests are not involved. 99 Additionally, the same standard of proof is not
involved. 100 Further, the role of the judge is not the same, the timeframes
involved are different, and it does not involve the same parties.101
Therefore, the court concluded that imposing the Strickland standard
would be improper and laid out a new standard including several elements
to be met.
The new standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel
claims includes the following elements: a strong presumption the attorney
representing a parent, as a professional subject to the standards of the legal
profession, has provided reasonable, professional assistance. 102 To
overcome that presumption and obtain relief, a parent must identify
specific errors of commission or of omission made by their counsel that
under the totality of the circumstances, evidence a deficiency in the
exercise of reasonable, professional judgment in the case.103 The parent
must establish that, cumulatively, this deficient representation so
prejudiced the outcome of the TPR proceeding that but for counsel’s
deficient representation the parent’s rights would not have been

94J.B.,

170 So. 3d at 792.
930 So. 2d at 726.
96L.W. v. Dep’t. of Children & Families, 812 So. 2d 551, 559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
(Wolf, J., concurring).
97RGB, 229 P.3d at 1091.
98J.B., 170 So. 3d at 792.
99Id. (quoting E.T., 930 So. 2d at 726).
100J.B., 170 So. 3d at 792; E.T., 930 So. 2d at 726 (Noting the standard of proof in
termination proceedings is clear and convincing evidence as opposed to beyond a
reasonable doubt in as criminal cases).
101Id.
102Id. at 792.
103Id.
95E.T.,
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terminated. 104 If the parent establishes the result of the TPR proceeding
would have been different absent the attorney’s deficient performance, the
order terminating parental rights should be vacated, and the case returned
to the circuit court for further proceedings. 105 This requires a showing of
prejudice that goes beyond the Strickland requirement that confidence in
the outcome is undermined. 106
With the new right to effective assistance of counsel, the court
properly promulgated a standard that was mindful of the best interests of
the child. 107 Requiring a strong showing of ineffectiveness makes it
difficult for a parent to succeed on their claim, thereby reducing the risk
of the termination order being reversed, further delaying the permanent
placement of the child. 108 By all means, if counsel is severely deficient,
then the parent is entitled to a new trial in comporting with due process
demands. 109 However, “a child who has been placed in foster care pursuant
to a dependency proceeding (or permanently placed after a TPR) should
not have to face potential disruption years after the dependency decision
has been made.” 110 The new standard sufficiently limits the potential for
years of litigation and instability by requiring the parent to show a clear
lack of competence, which had a detriment on the outcome of the case. 111
The Interim Procedure for Bringing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims
In developing a new procedure for parents to bring ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, the court noted that post-TPR proceedings
must assure a “prompt, short-lived process for adjudicating the claims
regarding termination of parental rights orders.” 112 The process must
proceed to a resolution within a strictly limited timeframe. 113 In that same
breath, however, the Florida Supreme Court sets out an interim procedure
that bears a risk of further delaying permanency for Florida’s children.
The interim procedure sets out responsibilities three-fold: actions to
be taken by the parents, actions to be taken by the circuit court, and actions
to be taken by counsel. 114 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel first
104Id.
105Id.
106Id.

at 792-93.
170 So. 3d at 793.
108Id. at 792-93.
109Id. at 793.
110L.W., 812 So. 2d at 559 (Wolf, J., concurring).
111J.B., 170 So. 3d at 792-93
112Id. at 794.
113Id. at 793.
114Id. at 794.
107J.B.,
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must be raised by the parent and ruled on by the trial court. 115 Indigent
parents, without the assistance of appointed counsel, must file a motion in
the circuit court claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the TPR
proceeding. 116 The parent shall have twenty days after the termination
judgment issues in which to file a motion in the trial court.117 In the
motion, the parent must identify specific acts or omissions in trial
counsel’s representation of the parent during the TPR proceedings that the
parent alleges constituted a failure to provide reasonable, professional
assistance. 118 The parent must explain how the errors or omissions
prejudiced the parent’s case in the termination proceeding to such an
extent that the result would have been different absent the deficient
performance. 119
The circuit court shall orally inform the parents of: the right to appeal
the order entered at the conclusion of the termination of parental rights
proceedings to the district court; the right to file a motion in the circuit
court alleging that appointed counsel provided constitutionally ineffective
assistance if the court enters a judgment terminating parental rights; and a
written order terminating parental rights shall include a brief statement
informing the parents of the right to effective assistance and a brief
explanation of the procedure for filing such a claim. 120 The trial court shall
promptly review the ineffective assistance motion and order compilation
of the record regarding the TPR proceedings on an expedited basis. 121 The
trial court shall conduct proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing if
necessary, to determine whether the motion should be granted or denied. 122
The court shall render an order within twenty-five days after the motion
alleging ineffective assistance was filed or the motion shall be deemed
denied. 123
Further, counsel of record cannot continue representation if a parent
chooses to file a motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. 124
Counsel must discuss appellate remedies and determine whether the parent
wants to appeal the TPR order. 125 If the parent wants to appeal the order,
then counsel must inquire whether the parent intends to file a motion
115Id.
116Id.

117J.B.,
118Id.

170 So. 3d at 794.

119Id.
120Id.
121Id.

122Id.

at 795.

123J.B.,

170 So. 3d at 795.
at 794.
125Id. at 795.
124Id.
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claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and immediately seek
withdrawal on this basis. 126 New counsel will be appointed for any appeal
from the TPR order and from the disposition of the ineffective assistance
of counsel motion. 127 The parent is entitled to appointed counsel with
regard to the termination in both the trial and appellate court, but not in
any trial court proceeding regarding a motion alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel. 128
The court then assigns the task of creating a permanent process,
subject to approval by the court, to a special committee consisting of
people with relevant expertise from related areas.129 The proposed rules
developed by this committee were ordered to be submitted to the court by
or on November 30, 2015. 130 However, as of the writing of this article, the
Florida Supreme Court has not issued a final opinion approving the
creation of a permanent process for parents to bring ineffective assistance
of counsel claims. Florida’s children are left to deal with the interim
procedure, risking the delay of their final placements.
FLORIDA SHOULD ADOPT THE DIRECT APPEAL PROCEDURE FOR
PARENTS TO BRING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS
Florida’s juvenile statutes define its purpose as the protection of
children and the recognition that most families desire to be competent
caregivers and providers for their children. The primary goal in a
dependency proceeding is to protect the child; it is not to punish the
parent. 131 Of paramount concern are the best interests of the child,
including a determination of their permanency goals, health, and safety. 132
The goal is to address the concerns of the child in the most economic,
effective, obvious, and direct manner. 133 The impact that abuse,
abandonment, or neglect has on the victimized child, siblings, family
structure, and inevitably on all citizens of the state has caused the
legislature to determine that the prevention of child abuse, abandonment,
and neglect shall be a priority of the State of Florida. 134 Since time is of
the essence for permanency of children in the dependency system, a parent
asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be raised on

126Id.
127Id.
128Id.

129J.B.,
130Id.

131FLA.

170 So. 3d at 795.

STAT. § 39.001(1)(a) and (b) (2015).
§ 39.621(5). See also FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)(b)1 (2015).
133FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)(b)3 (2015).
134FLA. STAT. § 39.001(8) (2015).
132Id.
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direct appeal. 135 Requiring the parent to first bring the claim in the trial
court risks unduly delaying permanency for Florida’s children.
Florida statutorily calls for an expedited review of any appeal of an
order terminating parental rights. 136 Florida Statute § 39.815(1) requires
that the District Court of Appeals shall give an appeal from an order
terminating parental rights priority in docketing and shall render a decision
on the appeal as expeditiously as possible. Further, Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.146 specifies the special procedures and time
limitations applicable to appeals from final orders in TPR proceedings. 137
Although the court in J.B. was mindful of the expedited review in the
appellate courts, it created an unnecessary, extra step of first bringing the
claim in the trial courts. Oddly, the court did not discuss the direct appeal
procedure or address the possibility of implementing it.
This omission may be due to the fact that the Florida appellate courts
have rejected attempts to assert ineffectiveness of counsel on direct
appeal. 138 The reason the courts have rejected the use of a direct appeal
procedure is because they feel the record on appeal may be insufficient to
establish viable claims. 139 “Even claims based on counsel’s actions
sometimes require evidentiary hearings to determine whether counsel
acted reasonably in the context of the litigation.” 140 However, while their
concerns are valid, a direct appeal procedure would be more expeditious
than first requiring a post-judgment motion. A direct appeal would be
faster because Florida already expedites appeals from TPR orders in its
statutes and appellate procedure rules. Therefore, there is no risk that an
appeal would be in limbo in the appellate court, taking months or years to
resolve.
Numerous other state courts have decided that employing a direct
appeal procedure is the most expeditious and effective way to bring
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in TPR proceedings. For example,
the Oregon Supreme Court has held that direct appeal is the best procedure
for bringing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 141 The court went
on to hold that the record on appeal was sufficient to decide the issue
without remand to the trial court; however, the appellate court should
135FLA.

STAT. § 39.621(1) (2015).
STAT. § 39.815(1) (2015).
137J.B., 170 So. 3d at 794. See also Fla.R.App.P. Rule 9.146(g) (2015).
138In re E.K., 33 So. 3d 125, 127 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); T.R. v. Dep’t. of Children &
Family Servs., 33 Fla. L. Weekly D2757 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); L.H. v. Dep’t. of Children
& Families, 995 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); E.T., 903 So. 2d 721; L.W., 812 So. 2d
551.
139E.T., 903 So. 2d at 728; L.W., 812 So. 2d at 557.
140E.T., 903 So. 2d at 730 (Stevenson, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141Geist, 796 P.2d at 1201.
136FLA.
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decide whether remand is necessary for an evidentiary hearing. 142 The
Pennsylvania Superior Court, on many occasions, has also held that direct
appeal is the proper procedure to bring ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. 143 In one case, the court held that direct appeal is the best procedure
because it eliminates any additional procedural steps and additional
hearings. 144 The New Mexico Court of Appeals also held that a parent’s
claim that he or she has been denied effective assistance of counsel may
be raised on direct appeal. 145 The court also stated that it may sometimes
be appropriate for the appellate court to remand a case to the trial court to
hold an evidentiary hearing. 146 Additionally, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that a direct appeal is likely to be faster than a post-judgment
motion. 147 The court stated that a direct appeal has the time limits imposed
by the statutes and rules governing appeals in New Jersey. 148 The court
felt that a direct appeal was the most expeditious procedure, and that in
many cases, the issue will be resolvable on the appeal record alone.149
The Florida Supreme Court should have established direct appeal as
the proper procedure for parents to bring ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, as opposed to bringing a post-judgment motion in the trial court.
Although the court established a time limit to bring the post-judgment
motion, this procedure still requires an additional hearing to be held in the
trial court, thereby delaying a final resolution in the case because if the
motion is granted, the parents will then appeal. 150 To the extent that many
claims of ineffectiveness will be denied in the trial court and then
appealed, this process will be lengthier than one allowing the
ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal. 151 Requiring the parent to file the
142Id.

at 1204.
re S.W., 781 A.2d 1247 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001); In re S.M., 614 A.2d 312 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992); In r Adoption of T.M.F., 573 A.2d 1035 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Matter of J.P.,
573 A.2d 1057 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
144T.M.F., 573 A.2d at 1044.
145Matter of Parental Rights of James W.H., 849 P.2d 1079, 1081 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
146Id.
147DYFS v. B.R., 929 A.2d 1034, 1039 (N.J. 2007).
148Id. See also N.J.R.A.R.2:9-1(c) (2015) (If the appellate court determines there to be a
genuine issue of material fact on the issue of counsel’s representation it may remand the
case to the trial judge for an accelerated hearing to be completed within 30 days); 1A N.J.
Prac., Court Rules Annotated R.2:10-6 (2015) (The issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel shall be raised on direct appeal. If the appellate court determines there to be a
genuine issue of material fact on the issue of counsel’s representation it may remand the
case to the trial judge and proceed in accordance with R. 2:9-1(c)).
149B.R., 929 A.2d at 1040.
150J.B., 170 So. 3d at 794 (A parent shall have twenty days after the termination judgment
issues within which to file a motion in the trial court alleging claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel).
151 CALKINS, supra note 60, at 209.
143In
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motion on their own without appointed counsel further risks a delay in
holding an appropriate hearing. 152 As a former judge has stated, “While it
is possible for a court to design and implement a process that includes a
trial court hearing for the purpose of factual findings, realistic judges know
that it is easier said than done.” 153
Additionally, the risk of the indigent parent improperly filing the
motion is substantial because the majority of these parents are uneducated
and may not be literate to write a motion on their own and then file it with
the court properly on their own. 154 Most importantly, they may not be in
the correct mental state to even formulate a motion and then argue it in
front of the trial judge who just terminated their parental rights to their
child, leading to unnecessary continuances of the evidentiary hearing. 155
The emotional toll that severing the parent-child relationship has on the
parent is overwhelming and with the combination of these factors,
permanency for Florida’s children will be delayed by the uncounseled
parent’s inability to adequately represent themselves. 156
Moreover, indigent parents are entitled to appointed counsel when
they appeal an order terminating their parental rights. Therefore, it would
be sufficient to simply allow them to include a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel on direct appeal, if applicable, since they will have
an attorney provided for them regardless. Since the Court has set such a
heightened standard for a parent to meet in determining effectiveness of
counsel, the question of whether the parents had a fair hearing and
effective representation can, in most circumstances, be determined by the
record. If a parent sets forth vague, unspecific, and general arguments that
their counsel was ineffective, then the appellate court can easily make a
ruling on those facts. If a parent were to raise arguments and present a
substantial question concerning issues other than those adjudicated at the
termination proceeding, then a remand would be proper. 157 Only in
extreme circumstances should the appellate court remand the case to the
trial for an evidentiary hearing to be completed within a set timeframe. In
keeping with the goals that the child’s best interests are always paramount,
the most persuasive reason for direct appeal is that, in most cases, it will
consume the least amount of time, thereby stabilizing the circumstances
of the child. 158
152J.B.,

170 So. 3d at 794 (Indigent parents without the assistance of appointed counsel
must file a motion in the trial court claiming ineffective assistance of counsel).
153CALKINS, supra note 60, at 209.
154Id. at 185.
155Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 30.
156Id.
157Geist, 796 P.2d at 1204.
158B.R., 929 A.2d at 1039. (quoting CALKINS, supra, at 207).
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FLORIDA SHOULD ADOPT PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR ATTORNEYS
REPRESENTING PARENTS IN TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
PROCEEDINGS
Representation by counsel means more than just having a warm body
with ‘J.D.’ credentials sitting next to a parent during termination of
parental rights proceedings. 159 The importance of having an effective and
competent attorney representing parents is paramount because in almost
all TPR cases, the parents are indigent. This means that the parents are
appointed free counsel by the court or provided counsel through the public
defender. The parents likely have little education, have had uncommon
difficulty in dealing with life, and who are, at the hearing, thrust into a
distressing and disorienting situation, unable to help prepare their case. 160
Two organizations in Florida have stated that the “level of practice in
dependency and termination proceedings is abysmal, and parents and
children suffer because of it.” 161 Having spent some time in the
dependency courtroom observing these types of cases, I can attest that
most attorneys need more guidance and training in dependency law.
Therefore, to reduce the risk of ineffective assistance of counsel claims
being filed and further delaying permanency, Florida should adopt
guidelines regarding standards of representation to ensure the highest
competency in their dependency attorneys.
There are two states that stand out in their standards of representation
for dependency attorneys: California and Louisiana. California, by court
rule, requires the trial courts to have standards of experience and education
that attorneys must meet to be eligible for court appointment in childdependency proceedings. 162 California defines “competent counsel” as
one who is a member of good standing of the State Bar of California, who
has participated in training in the law of juvenile dependency, and who
demonstrates adequate forensic skills, knowledge and comprehension of
the statutory scheme, the purposes and goals of dependency proceedings,
the specific statutes, rules of court, cases relevant to such proceedings, and
procedures for filing petitions for extraordinary writs. 163 This court rule
requires attorneys to have a minimum of eight hours of training or
education in dependency law or to have demonstrated sufficient

159James

W.H., 849 P.2d at 1080.
452 U.S. at 30.
161J.B., 170 So. 3d at 800 (Pariente, J., concurring) (quoting Amicus Curiae Brief of
Florida’s Children First & Univ. of Miami Sch. of Law Children & Youth Law Clinics at
10-11).
162CALKINS, supra, at 184. See also Cal. Rules of Ct. 5.660 (2015).
163Cal. Rules of Ct. 5.660(d)(1) (2015).
160Lassiter,
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experience in dependency proceedings.164 The attorney training must
include: an overview of dependency law and related statutes and cases and
information on child development, child abuse and neglect, substance
abuse, domestic violence, family reunification and preservation, and
reasonable efforts. 165 Every three years the attorneys are to complete eight
hours of education in dependency proceedings. 166 The court may also
require evidence of the competency of any attorney appointed to represent
a party in a dependency proceeding. 167
Louisiana, by administrative code, has trial court performance
standards for attorneys representing parents in dependency proceedings.
While these standards are not criteria for the judicial evaluation of alleged
misconduct of defense counsel, they are guidelines for attorneys to follow
that remind them of what their duties are.168 These standards concentrate
more on professionalism and adequate representation, serving several
purposes. First and foremost, the standards are intended to encourage
public defenders and appointed counsel to perform to a high standard of
representation and to promote professionalism in the representation of
parents in dependency proceedings.169 The standards are also intended to
alert defense counsel to courses of action to be taken in each case to ensure
that the client receives the best representation possible. 170 The code
requires counsel to be familiar with the substantive juvenile law and the
procedure utilized in dependency proceedings and to stay abreast of
changes and developments in the law. 171 It further requires that prior to
agreeing to undertake representation of a parent in a TPR proceeding,
counsel shall have sufficient experience or training to provide effective
representation. 172 Lastly, the code puts forth specific standards for counsel
to meet or exceed in TPR proceedings. 173 These standards include how to
properly: prepare for the hearing by having the appropriate listed
documentation, prepare for challenging the prosecution/agency’s case,
prepare for cross-examination by following the listed actions, prepare for
voir dire examination of witnesses, prepare for the presentation of a

164Id.

5.660(d)(3)(A).
5.660(d)(3)(A)(i)-(ii).
166Id. 5.660(d)(3)(B).
167Id. 5.660(d)(2).
168LA. ADMIN CODE. tit. 22, pt. XV, § 1101(D) (2015).
169Id. § 1101(A).
170Id. § 1101(B).
171Id. § 1107(A).
172Id. § 1107(B).
173LA. ADMIN CODE. tit. 22, pt. XV, § 1145(B) (2015).
165Id.
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defense by following the listed actions, and prepare and present an overall
defense strategy. 174
The Florida Supreme Court in J.B. should have additionally tasked
the special committee to develop professional standards of representation
and training for dependency attorneys. Florida Bar Rule of Professional
Conduct 4-1.1 states that “competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for
the representation,” and “to maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a
lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, engage
in continuing study and education, and comply with all continuing legal
education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.” In order to meet
this professionalism requirement, similar to California attorneys, Florida
attorneys in the field of dependency law should have to complete some
specified minimum hours of training each year. Because the trial courts
already have an extensive role in overseeing dependency proceedings,
they should periodically require the attorneys to submit evidence of their
competency in the field of dependency law in order to be available for
appointment. Because the entire dependency process is governed by one
statutory scheme, Florida Statutes Chapter 39, each stage of the
proceedings is part of a whole system of law. These standards would also
serve as reminders for dependency attorneys, guiding them in every step
of the dependency process, helping them effectively and competently
represent the parents. Therefore, requiring attorneys to complete trainings
in dependency law and having guidelines to follow will ensure effective
representation from the beginning, reducing the risk of ineffective
assistance of counsel claims being filed, further delaying permanency for
Florida’s children.
The purpose of having standards of representations is not to burden
Florida’s dependency attorneys with more duties, but to protect them from
the filing of meritless ineffective assistance of counsel claims from the
parents they represent. Further, it is also a protection for the parents who
are at risk of losing the rights to their child indefinitely. Most importantly,
it protects the children from having to wait longer to be placed into a
permanent living situation because an attorney incompetently handled the
proceeding the first time. For “nowhere is timeliness more important than
in a dependency proceeding where a delay of months may seem like
forever to a young child.” 175

174Id.

§ 1145(B)(1)(a)(i)-(xi), (B)(3)(a), (B)(3)(d)(i)-(xi), (B)(3)(e), (B)(4)(c)(i)-(vii),
(B)(4)(a).
175In re Kristin H, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722, 741 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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CONCLUSION
TPR involves a unique kind of deprivation involving the authority of
the State to permanently destroy legal recognition of the parental
relationship. 176 Surely there can be few losses more grievous than the
abrogation of that relationship. 177 Because of the delicate interest at stake
and the severity of a deprivation of that interest in TPR proceedings, it is
essential that parents are represented adequately by competent counsel; the
United States and Florida Constitutions grant them that right. However,
vindicating that right should not come at the expense of children left in
dependency limbo. Timely disposition of TPR ineffective assistance of
counsel claims is essential in light of the harm to the child that results when
permanency is unduly delayed. 178 Finality in the resolution of TPR cases
should be achieved as expeditiously as possible, consistent with due
process. 179 The way to achieve finality in the most expeditious way is to
allow parents to bring ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct
appeal. This will safeguard the permanency of the child by reducing the
risk of prolonging the case at the trial court level through post-judgment
motions.
Competent legal counsel has and always will be demanded in our
legal system. There is no substitute for competent counsel, because
counsel’s primary responsibility has always been to ferret out all the facts
of a case and bring them to the attention of the trial judge. 180 Unless
counsel for parents in TPR proceedings are held to a minimum level of
competence through training and education requirements, the parent’s
right to counsel would be nothing more than a right to be accompanied
into court by an individual who may be utterly incapable of defending his
client’s interests. 181 In reality, the majority of dependency attorneys are
very competent and provide effective representation to the parents.
However, the few should not be overlooked because the majority prevail.
Every effort should be made to ensure that every attorney practicing
dependency law is held to the same requirements and standards. This
standard is the only way to safeguard against unduly delaying permanency
for Florida’s children. There is little that can be as detrimental to a child’s
sound development as uncertainty over whether he is to remain in his
current “home” under the care of his parents or foster parents, especially
176M.E.K.,

921 So. 2d at 791 (quoting M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 128 (1996)).
452 U.S. at 40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
178J.B., 170 So. 3d at 793.
179Geist, 796 P.2d at 1200.
180Price, 573 A.2d at 1069 (Montemuro, J., concurring and dissenting).
181T.M.F., 573 A.2d at 1053 (Beck, J., concurring).
177Lassiter,
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when such uncertainty is prolonged. 182 Requiring dependency attorneys to
adhere to educational trainings and standards of representation are the only
ways to safeguard against unduly delaying permanency for Florida’s
children. The welfare of our youth cannot be forsaken – Florida’s children
are simply too important. 183
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Lehman, 458 U.S. at 513.
S.M. v. Florida Dep’t of Children & Families, 202 So. 3d 769, 784 (Fla. 2016)
(quoting Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571).
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